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Articles
Constitutional Turf Wars: Competing for the
Consent of the Governed
by
DONALD E. LWvELY*
Debate over the role of the American judiciary is as established
and enduring as the American republic. Chief Justice Marshall, in
1803, announced that it was the role of the judiciary to decide "what
the law is."' In asserting if not arrogating judicial supremacy on
matters constitutional, Marshall identified no general criteria for de-
termining when executive, legislative, or state action or policy might
be jurisprudentially displaced. Competing to fill the resultant void
ever since have been an array of theories vying to fix the perimeters
of judicial review.
Justice Story, in the early nineteenth century, depicted the Con-
stitution as "practical [in] nature ... designed for common use, and
fitted for common understandings." 2 Story's vision of judicial review
as an essentially mechanical task was restated at the end of the Loch-
ner era3 when the Court identified its task as merely "lay[ing] the
article of the Constitution which is involved beside the statute which
is challenged and . .. decid[ing] whether the latter squares with the
* Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Toledo; J.D. 1979, University of
California, Los Angeles; M.S. 1970, Northwestern University; A.B. 1969, University of
California, Berkeley.
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (invalidating in part the
Judiciary Act of 1789 and establishing power of judicial review).
2. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSMTI ON OF THE UNITED STATES 345 (1905).
3. Lochnerism is a short-hand characterization of the constitutional jurisprudence that
substantively asserted and amplified the due process guarantee of the fourteenth amendment.
In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Court enunciated economic liberty as a
fundamental right. The consequent and persistent judicial displacement of state economic
regulation found at odds with fourteenth amendment liberty and of federal economic legislation
adjudged beyond the purview of the commerce power ultimately led to a confrontation between
the executive and judicial branches. President Roosevelt's Court-packing scheme and forceful
criticism of the judiciary's obstruction of New Deal reforms has had a profound legacy.
Lochnerism is routinely alleged by critics and ritually disavowed by the Court when it actuates
the fourteenth amendment in a substantive fashion. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
407 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (accusing Court of Lochnerism in recognizing right to
marry); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (disclaiming Lochnerism
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former." ' 4 Observing that "the Court has no power to add to or sub-
tract from the procedures set forth by the Founders," 5 Justice Black
more recently emphasized the notion that the judiciary should be
entirely apolitical.
The modern demand for a judiciary disinterested in policy rep-
resents, in large part, a response to jurisprudence that earlier this
century vitalized the fourteenth amendment in terms accounting for
economic and other liberties 6 and more recently has fashioned new
rights of privacy 7 and honed the equal protection guarantee as a cut-
ting edge against discrimination.8 The sense that judge-made law is
fundamentally antidemocratic has engendered a set of principles cal-
culated to delimit the judiciary's political impact. Literalism, for in-
stance, demands reading the Constitution "in a straightforward
manner... pay[ing] close attention to its words and avoid[ing] twist-
ing or stretching [its] meanings. " 9 Textual focus essentially represents
a methodology calculated to limit the judiciary's influence to in-
stances in which the Constitution manifestly allows for intercession.
Literalism loses its utility, however, when the document's open-ended,
unamplified and more likely to be litigated terms are implicated. 0
Augmenting or supplanting literalism, as theories of judicial self-
restraint, are the concepts of originalism, neutrality, structuralism,
and voidism. Originalism requires the judiciary to advert to and be
guided by the framers' intent." Such a reference point is problematic
insofar as it is susceptible to the treacheries of motive-based in-
quiry.' 2 Originalism also discounts the reality that the charter was
not a perfect or finished work. Its construction and ratification, for
instance, were consciously effectuated by the calculated slighting of
a discrete class of humanity. 3 Undifferentiating genuflection to the
while asserting family rights); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965) (disclaiming
Lochnerism in establishing right of privacy); id. at 507-08 (Black, J., dissenting) (accusing
Court of Lochnerism).
4. This characterization was offered by Justice Roberts, who wrote for the majority in
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1935).
5. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
6. See supra note 3 and infra notes 149, 192-193 and accompanying text.
7. See supra note 3 and infra notes 111-116, 150, 202-206 and accompanying text.
8. See supra note 3 and infra notes 34-35, 150, 198-201 and accompanying text.
9. See L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE Tins HONORABLE COURT 41 (1985).
10. See infra notes 36-61 and accompanying text.
11. See D. LIVELY, JUDIcIAL REVIEW AND THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED: ACTIVIST
WAYS AND POPULAR ENDS 56 (1990).
12. See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
13. To ensure the Constitution's acceptability to the South, the framers consciously
accommodated slavery. The resultant document, for instance, regarded slaves as three-fifths
of a person for purposes of representative apportionment and taxation. U.S. CONST. art. I, §
2. The Constitution also imposed a moratorium on any federal legislation terminating the
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framers, therefore, may operate as a methodology for compounding
rather than resolving'original mistakes or avoiding unfinished busi-
ness.
Neutrality, like literalism and originalism, seeks to maximize
consistency, minimize subjectivity, and curtail the judiciary's anti-
democratic potential.' 4 Neutral analysis requires attention to text and
historical evidence for purposes of identifying a pertinent enumerated
principle and calibrating its degree of generality. 15 Principles, once
identified, must be applied consistently.' 6 The consequent constancy
is expected to preclude opportunities for ideological manipulation
that otherwise might influence the development of the law. Neu-
trality, however, is a false and unrealistic ideal.' 7
Structuralism references the type of government begotten by the
Constitution and the document's structure as analytical guides. 8 Al-
though invested in by jurists and scholars of diverse ideological stripes,
structuralism is a vague and imprecise premise. Instead of curtailing
the judiciary's political potential, structuralism actually may enhanceit.19
Voidism purports to minimize contact points between the Con-
stitution and governance whenever meaning cannot be gleaned pur-
suant to approved methodologies of restraint. The voidist theory is
that if a constitutional passage cannot be understood pursuant to
literalism, originalism, or structuralism, it should be disregarded and
rendered inoperative. 20 Such a premise, if fully embraced, would have
profound consequences for such constitutional furnishings as the
fourteenth amendment. 2' Especially insofar as evidence of original
meaning is scarce2 and constitutional implications and results con-
tinue to be debated, voidism may render critical passages of the doc-
ument inanimate.23
slave trade. Id. § 9. At least ten provisions of the Constitution have been identified as
calculated to accommodate slavery. See W. WmcEK, THE SouRcEs OF ANTISLAV ERY CONSTI-
TUTrIONALiSM iN AmuCA: 1760-1848, at 62-63 (1977).
14. A central premise of representative governance is that the exercise of power must be
based upon the consent of the governed, which is presumed to be a manifest of the elected
legislative branch. See A. BicEr, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-20 (1986).
15. See R. BoRK, THE TE MTrIN oF AmEUCA 149 (1990); Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. Rnv. 1, 6 (1959).
16. R. BoRK, supra note 15, at 151-53.
17. See infra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
18. See R. BoaR, supra note 15, at 165.
19. See infra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 123-129 and accompanying text.
21. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
22. The Constitutional Convention was conducted in secrecy. The notes of James Madison
have proved to be the only comprehensive accounting of what actually transpired.
23. See infra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
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In contrast to generally circumscriptive theories of review stands
the concept of noninterpretivism. Exponents of a noninterpretivist
regimen suggest that legislative action may be displaced when at odds
with deeply rooted but documentally unenumerated constitutional
ideals. 24 The notion of an unwritten constitution as a source of par-
amount principle presumes that the courts should be free to define
fundamental law and thus displace legislative output pursuant to a
sense of what is morally apt. 25 Noninterpretivism essentially recycles
the idea of natural law and thus has been criticized26 on the ground
that its adherents must accept not only Roe v. Wade27 but Lochner
v. New York 28 and Dred Scott v. Sandford.29
What the architects and messengers of interpretivism and non-
interpretivism have in common, despite their fundamental disagree-
ments, is a cottage industry of debate and scholarship that tends to
be miscalculated and misplaced. Disputing the judiciary's role is a
well established exercise that continues to renew and reinvent itself.
Arguments for fixing the judiciary's function in narrow or broad
terms, regardless of how elegantly framed, often reflect the operation
of convenience rather than principle. The contemporary debate over
affirmative action, for instance, reveals self-styled champions of re-
straint playing an interventionist role 0 and supposed activists pro-
pounding the virtues of restraint.3' For both, theory of review seems
24. See, e.g., Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STA. L. REv. 703, 706
(1975).
25. Id.
26. See R. BopK, supra note 15, at 209-10.
27. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state regulation of abortion displaced by judicially glossed
fourteenth amendment right of personal choice).
28. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (state regulation of working conditions displaced by judicially
glossed fourteenth amendment liberty of contract).
29. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (federal regulation of slavery displaced by judicially
glossed fifth amendment property rights).
30. Exponents of fourteenth amendment restraint, for instance, have introduced discrim-
inatory purpose criteria that effectively confound the equal protection guarantee's efficacy for
minorities. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). Discriminatory motive may be
hidden or, when action is the result of multiple and competing agendas and aims, impossible
to pinpoint as a singular reality. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. The philosophy
of restraint has proved more selective than general, however, for jurists, including Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and White, who have been quick to invoke equal
protection to defeat race conscious remediation. See e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 526-27 (1989); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
31. For those jurists who ordinarily invoke equal protection assertively, the notion that
review of racial classifications should be strict is inapt when affirmative action is implicated.
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 528 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Even seemingly obsolete principles
have been resurrected when convenient, as evidenced by the Court's reference to spectrum
scarcity as a justification for minority preferences in the broadcast licensing process. Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3010 (1990). Scarcity had been so extensively and
effectively criticized that the Court itself questioned its viability in FCC v. League of Women
secondary to analyses and results pitched primarily in terms of pol-
icy.32
Discourse over the role of the judiciary, despite its long history,
has assumed too much and yielded too little. The notion that the
judiciary is inherently antidemocratic, or that it at least must be sub-
jected to some meaningful principle of political restraint, is widely
accepted as a truth. The premise, however, tends to be a function
of assumption rather than understanding. Contrary to conventional
wisdom, politically referenced flexibility and mutability are among
the judiciary's most positive traits. Although the Court aptly may
be criticized for institutional overreaching and imperialism at critical
times, 33 its participation in the political process has proved crucial
both.to democratic and societal progress. The determination that
official segregation was unconstitutional, 34 athough at odds with or-
iginalism, neutrality, structuralism, and voidism, is a particularly
striking example of how political jurisprudence may be congruent,
rather than at odds, with democratic and moral imperatives. 35 If suc-
cessful, theories of review aiming to preclude jurisprudential atten-
tion to policy would redefine the judiciary in a radical fashion and,
by undermining well-established expectations of a political function,
repudiate rather than affirm the consent of the governed.
This Article (1) examines the enduring debate over the judi-
ciary's role and the theoretical premises which continue to evolve and
circulate; (2) suggests that the terms and output of the controversy
are generally misconceived; and (3) explains why a politically re-
sponsive judiciary facilitates rather than retards society's democratic
and developmental interests.
I. The -Sirens of Jurisprudential Apoliticism
A fundamental miscalculation of any constitutional theorist is
to expect a perfect theory of judicial review. Positive law is not akin
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376-77 n.11 (1984), and the FCC eventually abandoned it. In re Syracuse
Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, 5054 (1987), aff'd, Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867
F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
32. Race conscious remediation has been invalidated pursuant to equal protection analysis
on grounds it promotes harmful stereotypes, injures innocent victims, advances racial politics,
and may be limitless. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94. Racial preferences have been upheld,
however, to the extent that they have been mandated by Congress and perceived as promoting
important policy interests. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc., 110 S. Ct. at 3009 (racial preferences
in broadcast licensing process promote important governmental interest in ownership and
editorial diversity).
33. Affirmance of slavery, creation of economic rights, and formulation of the desegre-
gation mandate are examples of judicial activism that have engendered such criticism. See
supra note 3 and infra notes 152-156, 177-185 and accompanying text.
34. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. See infra notes 151-185 and accompanying text. -
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to physical or other types of law that are susceptible to empirical
testing and proof. Legal theories are evaluated not merely on the
basis of predictability and reliability, but also for efficiency, integ-
rity, and ideology. The one certain impact of any propounded theory
of review is arousal of critical and adverse reaction. Susceptibility
to reproval, owing to disparate visions of and expectations from the
judiciary, counsels that any general theory should be a function of
modest rather than great expectations.
A. Literalism
The literalist (or strict constructionist) school instructs that doc-
umental text is the departure, and whenever possible the termination,
point for constitutional review. "Lay[ing] the article of the Consti-
tution . . . beside the statute, ' 3 6 however, offers more imagery than
utility. Literalism affords no guidance when documental terminology
is unclear or its meaning is disputed. Strict constructionism thus makes
sense only when terms or conditions are irrefutably clear and not
susceptible to dispute and litigation anyway. Because the Constitu-
tion does not always speak for itself, strict constructionism is un-
serviceable when it is most needed.
Although the powers of the federal government are documentally
prescribed, delineation of authority is imprecise. Congress' power to
regulate interstate commerce,37 for example, is a primary source of com-
prehensive and extensive federal regulation of activity ranging from
purely economic matters to civil rights38 and criminal conduct.3 9 Despite
its prolific use, the interstate commerce power has been subject to di-
vergent perceptions of what constitutes interstate transactions4° and
commerce itself.41 The documental charge for Congress to enact "nec-
36. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress has the power "[tlo regulate Commerce . . .
among the several States").
38. E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (upholding proscription of
discrimination in public restaurants).
39. E.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1971) (upholding federal crimin-
alization of loan sharking).
40. The Court has defined interstate commerce, for instance, to encompass essentially
intrastate activity that, even if independently insignificant, would implicate interstate commerce
when compounded with other such activity. E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28
(1942).
41. The Court, during the first third of the twentieth century, distinguished between the
manufacturing and transportation processes. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 253
(1918) (distinguishing "[c]ommerce" from "the making of goods and the mining of coal,"
and holding that, although "the regulatory power of Congress is ample" over the former, the
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essary and proper" 42 laws, although facilitating the exercise of enu-
merated powers, has raised more questions than it has answered. 43
The poverty of literalism is even more profound when examined
in the context of individual rights. Though a literal focus may be apt
if, for instance, the issue is whether a twenty-five-year-old Jamaican
can run for president,44 litigation and the need for judicial review are
improbable when answers are manifest. The Constitution enumerates
basic rights in such inexact terms as: "freedom of speech, or of the
press"; 45 "the free exercise" of religion; 46 "[tihe right. .. to be secure
... against unreasonable searches and seizures";47 "the right to a
speedy and public trial";" the right to "an impartial jury"; 49 the right
to "assistance of counsel' ";50 the right to be free from "[e]xcessive
bail' 51 and "cruel and unusual punishment[]"; 52 the right to una-
bridged "privileges [or] immunities" ;53 the right to "due process of
law";54 and the right to "equal protection of the laws.' '5 Terms such
as unreasonable, speedy, impartial, excessive, cruel, unusual, due, and
equal are noteworthy for their imprecision, and so present points of
analytical commencement rather than pretermission.
Notwithstanding its patently limited utility, strict constructionism
has not been without prominent advocates. Justice Black urged a
seemingly unqualified version of freedom of speech and of the press
that was essentially literalist. For Black, the framers had performed
latter "is a matter of local regulation."). As a consequence, Congress' power to regulate
employment and industrial conditions was narrowed and largely denied. Such analysis contrasts
with modem standards of review which depict the commerce power expansively. E.g., Perez
v. United States, 402 U.S. at 154 ("credit transactions, though purely intrastate," may in
Congress' judgment "affect interstate commerce" and thus fall within its regulatory purview).
42. U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 18 (Congress has the power "[tlo make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the powers enumerated by Article
I.).
43. Chief Justice Marshall, instead of defining the necessary and proper clause in terms
of strict necessity, concluded that it empowered Congress to enact legislation reasonably
necessary to effectuate constitutionally assigned ends. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 324-25 (1819).
44. Eligibility standards for aspiring presidents, including age requirements, are precisely
set forth in U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
45. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
46. Id.
47. Id. amend. IV.
48. Id. amend. VI.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. amend. VIII.
52. Id.
53. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
54. Id. amend. V and XIV, § 1.
55. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
all balancing permissible between first amendment interests and com-
peting concerns.5 6 Ultimately, even Black himself disclosed the limited
utility of strict constructionism. His distinction between speech and
conduct5 7 and his support for a diminished constitutional status for
new media, 8 evinced participation in precisely the value-driven first
amendment differentiation that he purportedly condemned.
Literalism may be most notable as a source of political mischief
and demagoguery. Richard Nixon's 1968 campaign promise to appoint
strict constructionists effectively tapped into public concern over the
Warren Court with respect to desegregation. 9 Despite professed op-
position to judicially crafted law, Ronald Reagan pledged to appoint
judges who would "respect traditional family values and the sanctity
of innocent human life." 6° George Bush promised to appoint judges
who would interpret the Constitution as it was written. 6' In each in-
stance, the promise of nonpoliticism was pitched toward manifestly
political ends. Strict constructionism thus has proved serviceable as
a means of advancing rather than minimizing politicism.
B. Originalism
Few if any jurists or legal scholars regard literalism as an exclusive
analytical methodology. When strict constructionism fails, as it in-
variably does, exponents of restraint suggest originalism as the apt
jurisprudential alternative. Inquiry into official purpose, however, too
often constitutes an exercise in delusion rather than discovery. Search-
ing for original intent, like any other effort to glean the purpose of
a decision or policy making body comprised of diverse individuals,
is destined to founder upon discernment of competing and compro-
56. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 60-61 (1961) (Black,
J., dissenting) (framers performed all balancing required and permitted by first amendment).
57. Black regarded "[s]tanding, patrolling or marching" to make a political statement
not as speech but as "conduct that can be regulated or prohibited." Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring).
58. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969) (unanimously holding
that the broadcasting spectrum was a scarce resource and that the editorial autonomy of radio
and television licensees therefore could be diminished to advance the interests of fairness and
balance).
59. During the 1968 presidential campaign, Nixon promised to appoint to the Supreme
Court strict constructionists who would curb the operation of equal protection which then was
being read as a dictate for forceful application of the desegregation mandate. See B. SCHWARTZ,
SWANN'S WAY: THE SCHOOL BUSING CASE AND THE SUPREME COURT 186-89 (1986).
60. Brownstein, With or Without Supreme Court Changes, Reagan Will Reshape the
Federal Bench, 49 NAT'L J. 2338, 2341 (1984).
61. Vice President George Bush, Second Presidential Debate, Oct. 13, 1988, transcribed
in N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1988, at A14, col. 1.
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mised aims and agendas. Justice Scalia, in the establishment clause
context, 62 effectively depicted the unserviceability of motive-based in-
quiry in noting that:
It]he number of possible motivations, to begin with, is not binary,
or indeed even finite.... [A] particular legislator need not have voted
for [a law] either because he wanted to foster religion or because he
wanted to improve education. He may have thought the bill would
provide jobs for his district, or may have wanted to make amends
with a faction of his party he had alienated on another vote, or he
may have been a close friend of the bill's sponsor, or he may have
been repaying a favor he owed the majority leader, or he may have
hoped the Governor would appreciate his vote and make a fun-
draising appearance for him, or he may have been pressured to vote
for a bill he disliked by a wealthy contributor or by a flood of con-
stituent mail, or he may have been seeking favorable publicity, or
he may have been reluctant to hurt the feelings of a loyal staff mem-
ber who worked on the bill, or he may have been settling an old score
with a legislator who opposed the bill, or he may have been mad at
his wife who opposed the bill, or he may been intoxicated and utterly
unmotivated when the vote was called, or he may have accidentally
voted 'yes' instead of 'no' or, of course, he may have had (and very
likely did have) a combination of some of the above and many other
motivations. To look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator
is probably to look for something that does not exist. 63
Despite effective criticism64 and even general repudiation of mo-
tive-based inquiry,65 the Court continues to invest in it for purposes
of equal protection review." Since formulating the discriminatory in-
tent standard as a prerequisite for establishing constitutionally sig-
nificant racial discrimination, equal protection has been substantially
devitalized as a guarantee for minorities. 7 Because criteria conse-
62. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .... ").
63. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-37 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64. Justice Rehnquist asserted that it was futile to determine whether a legislature, in
prohibiting certain size trucks from its highways, had violated the commerce clause by
discriminating against out-of-state interests. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450
U.S. 662, 702-03 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65. The Court rejected motive-based inquiry in the freedom of speech context on the
ground that "the stakes [were] sufficiently high ... to eschew guesswork." United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968).
66. E.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312-13 (1987) (statistical disparities in capital
punishment did not evidence intentional discrimination); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-71 (1977) (no evidence that zoning restrictions on low
income housing represented intentional discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
246 (1976) (no evidence that job testing procedures were used to intentionally discriminate).
67. Over the past decade, the Court has upheld constitutional claims of discrimination
against racial minorities only in the context of the jury selection process, when an overtly
discriminatory law was challenged, and in response to a claim -that an anti-busing measure
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quently are attuned to discerning overtly race-dependent policies, the
guarantee now operates mainly to preclude or destabilize affirmative
action initiatives.6 8
Subscription to motive-based inquiry is problematic not only be-
cause of its selectiveness but also because of its notorious lack of pro-
ductivity. Framers may have supported the document or a particular
provision for diverse reasons. Ratifiers had at least as many mixed
motives in approving it. What awaits any inquiry into the past, there-
fore, are competing and uncertain motives. The obstacle to original
understanding is not mitigated by the notion that what the framers
and ratifiers meant "must be taken to be what the public of that time
would have understood the words to mean."' 69 Discerning "what the
public understood" would be as confounding an inquiry and, given
the even greater permutations of opinion and sentiments, many times
more vain.
Modern champions of judicial restraint, who propound origin-
alism as a viable interpretive methodology, themselves appear to en-
gage in review at variance with apoliticism. First amendment
jurisprudence, for instance, has evolved a classification process that
essentially ranks variants of speech for constitutional purposes. While
obscenity 0 and fighting words7' have been excluded from the first
amendment's protective ambit, defamatory, 72 privacy breaching 7 and
constituted a race-dependent redistribution of political power. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from jury at
odds with equal protection); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (state criminal
law enacted at turn of century invalidated pursuant to evidence of discriminatory motive);
Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 474-75 (1982) (initiative removing
school board's power to make racially based school assignments and provide for busing of
students found violative of fourteenth amendment).
68. During the 1980s, the Court invalidated affirmative action plans in City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-506 (1989), and Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986). It also determined that preferential hiring and promotion programs
implemented pursuant to consent decrees could be challenged by parties who did not participate
in the original litigation. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762-69 (1989).
69. R. BoRc, supra note 15, at 144.
70. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) (obscenity excluded from the first
amendment's purview because it lacks social value).
71. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-73 (1942) (fighting words are "no
essential part of any exposition of ideas").
72. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974) (defamation action by public
figure or public official is distinguishable from actions by private individual); Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162-65 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (defamation action by public
figure requires showing of actual malice); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-
80 (1964) (defamation action by public official requires showing of actual malice).
73. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 536 (1989) (no invasion of privacy action
allowable, absent state interest of highest order, when published information legally acquired
and related to matter of public significance).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
commercial speech 4 have been afforded qualified protection. Political
speech is identified, especially by judicial conservatives, as the most
constitutionally revered and protected form of expression. 75
The reservation of maximum first amendment concern for speech
relating to informed self-government is incongruous with events con-
temporaneous to the Constitution's introduction. Rivalry between
Federalists and Republicans, relating back to the chartering process,
defined the political culture in the years immediately after ratifica-
tion.76 In 1798, President Adams and a Federalist Congress, endeav-
oring to neuter their Republican competition, enacted the Sedition Act77
which among other things criminalized speech critical of the govern-
ment28 The first amendment, by its literal and original terms, guar-
antees against abridgment of "freedom of speech, or of the press"
by Congress. 79 Introduction of a draconian scheme to suppress ex-
pression, within several years of ratification and by some of the Con-
stitution's own fabricators, suggests that advertence to original intent
may furnishsome unsettling advice. Given a document that is the work
of multiple aims rather than any singular purpose, inquiry into original
intent affords an opportunity for selecting principles that are con-
venient rather than consensual. Originalism thus may be useful for
precisely the political purposes that its advocates deplore.
C. Neutrality
Beyond literalism and originalism, neutrality has been advanced
as a methodology for ensuring that the judiciary does not operate in
an antidemocratic fashion. The crux of neutrality is that courts, having
derived a principle from text or original understanding, must apply
that precept in all cases to which it reasonably relates.80 The selection
74. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 340-
47 (1986) (commercial expression not regulable unless false or pursuant to substantial state
interest and narrowly drawn regulation that directly advances the governmental interest).
75. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 595-99
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasizing primacy of political speech in constitutional
value scheme).
76. The political circumstances and times immediately after ratification of the Constitution
are depicted in L. Lavy, EMERGENCE OF A FREEa PRass (1985).
77. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
78. Despite the first amendment issues presented by the Sedition Act, which lapsed in
1801, the Act was never challenged in court.
79. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. Incorporation of the first amendment into the fourteenth
amendment, so that it protected against abridgement of expression by states, occurred in
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
80. See R. BORK, supra note 15, at 151.
August 1991] CONSTITUTIONAL TURF WARS 1537
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
and operation of a principle supposedly will not be influenced by con-
sideration of its political meaning or impact.
As a methodology of review, neutrality neither offers compre-
hensive guidance nor precludes politically inspired decisions. Once a
principle is neutrally derived, its ambit or level of generality must be
ascertained. 8' The equal protection guarantee, for instance, affords
options of black equality, racial equality, or general equality. Original
understanding of the fourteenth amendment, as revealed by legislative
history 2 and initial jurisprudence, 83 intimates primary attention to a
discrete racial class. History also discloses a qualified constitutional
concern with equal opportunity for black material self-development
and parity before the law, 84 but a tolerance of "[m]ere discrimina-
tions." 85
Neutral principles tied to original understanding, if rigorously ob-
served, would continue to graft a doctrinal formula for official seg-
regation onto the fourteenth amendment. Emergence of the
desegregation mandate creates a dilemma for neutralists, insofar as
original intent manifestly did not contemplate desegregation and
pointedly accommodated racial separation.8 6 Proponents of neutrality
have endeavored to square the desegregation principle with apolitical
demands by suggesting that the challenge to official discrimination
required the Court either to invest in a methodology disfavored by the
fourteenth amendment's framers or deactivate equal protection al-
together. 87 The notion that a proper choice in Brown v. Board of
81. Id. at 148.
82. Unlike most inquiries into legislative intent, scrutiny of the record compiled by the
architects of the fourteenth amendment discloses uncommon agreement that the-provision was
concerned with securing limited rights and equality for blacks. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT
By JuDIcIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 20-36 (1977) (general
consensus among framers that fourteenth amendment was meant to establish equality of basic
economic opportunity and standing before law).
83. The Court, in its first reading of the fourteenth amendment, determined that its
central concern was with "action of a state ... directed by way of discrimination against the
negroes as a class." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
84. See supra note 82.
85. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883). A formative interpretation of the
fourteenth amendment was that neither the provision itself nor Congress could reach private
discriminatory action. Id. at 11. Segregation of public venues, such as trains and theaters, was
regarded as "[mlere discrimination[]" that society traditionally had countenanced and thus
was legally insignificant. Id. at 24-25.
86. The reconstruction Congress which authored the fourteenth amendment also provided
for racial segregation of public schools in the District of Columbia. See R. BERGER, supra
note 82, at 123-24.
87. It is suggested, therefore, that the Court's only choice was "either to abandon the
quest for equality by allowing segregation or to forbid segregation in order to achieve equality."
R. BORK, supra note 15, at 82; see also infra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
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Education8 was between two extreme alternatives, each of which was
at odds with original understanding, 9 represents a procrustean effort
to reconcile a political but constitutionally apt decision with principles
of restraint. Attempted harmonization of the desegregation mandate
with neutrality succeeds only in straining doctrinal reality. An expla-
nation and accounting aimed at establishing critical respectability is
itself reducible to political imperative resulting in self-inflicted damage
to credibility. The devolution of Brown pursuant to limiting principles,
such as the discriminatory intent standard, 90 has revealed a third op-
tion which is closer to original aims than the either-or choice identified
by professed neutralists. Distinctions between de jure and de facto
segregation 9' and the consequent constriction of the duty to deseg-
regate, 92 compounded by reversion of review from strict scrutiny to
mere rationality when discriminatory purpose is not established 93 re-
veal a jurisprudential development consonant in spirit with original
qualified equalization concerns.
Even assuming no political motivation, the neutrality model also
may be problematic in explaining variations in pitch or degree of prin-
ciple. The issue of race-conscious remediation, for instance, has en-
gendered arguments for and against the notion that all racial
classifications should be constitutionally suspect. 94 The idea that the
Constitution is absolutely color-blind transcends original vision and
is associated with a sense of the fourteenth amendment as a guarantee
88. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
89. See R. BoRx, supra note 15, at 81-83.
90. Due to a post-Brown requirement that segregation must be purposeful to, be consti-
tutionally significant, the desegregation mandate did not reach much of the north and west..
City and suburban desegregation plans were required but, unless prompted by official action,
the duty to desegregate terminated once a unitary system was established regardless of whether
resegregation eventuated. See Lively, Separate but Equal: The Low Road Reconsidered, 14
HAsnNcms CoNsT. L.Q. 43, 58-66 (1986).
91. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) ("mhe differentiating
factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation ... is purpose or intent
to segregate") (emphasis in original).
92. See supra note 90.
93. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1976).
94. Four justices have argued that even remedial classifications should be suspect because
they harm innocent victims, stigmatize, foster racial politics, and may be limitless. City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (opinion by O'Connor, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., White, and Kennedy, JJ.). Justice Scalia adheres to the principle that
racial classifications are treacherous and thus constitutionally invalid under all circumstances
except those of the most exigent nature. Id. at 520-21, 526-28 (Scalia, J., concurring). Three
justices have suggested that remedial classifications are essential, insofar as society persists in
race-conscious ways and race-dependent judgments, because such a methodology is necessary
to overcome racism. Id. at 552-53 (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). Stevens
maintains that remedial classifications may be proper if narrowly tailored. Id. at 515-16
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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of comprehensive racial equality. 95 Contentions that historically dis-
advantaged racial groups should be excluded from that general
proposition96 are consonant with an intuitive sense that equal protec-
tion has special meaning for them. Insofar as the neutrality model does
not yield obvious choices, opportunity for politically-motivated judg-
ment is not foreclosed. Like originalism, neutrality actually may ob-
scure ideological inspiration.
At worst, neutrality may be a disguise rather than a cure for re-
sult-oriented jurisprudence. Even if not facilitating blind adherence to
precedent, insistence upon constancy and congruity discounts inevi-
table disagreement over which facts and issues are comparable. Neu-
trality also disregards the multiplicity and relativity of principles that
should be factored into a given decision. Since a particular jurispru-
dential result may be attributable to more than one reason, subsequent
outcomes may differ because of honest but nonetheless disputed per-
ceptual variances over what is significant. Introduction of principle,
moreover, does not preclude amplification, compounding, or mutation
of political judgment. As a check upon the purported evil of anti-
democratic jurisprudence, neutrality is more illusory than real.
D. Structuralism
Some theorists have suggested that, when constitutional specifics
and original indications fail, documental structure may inform juris-
prudential understanding. 97 Appurtenant to the promptings of struc-
tural awareness and appreciation is the proposition that jurists should
understand that the Constitution intended a "workable govern-
ment." '9 8 Attention to documental structure of and consequences for
governance is redolent of Chief Justice Marshall's sense that it was
necessary to understand the "great objects" for which the Consti-
tution and system of government were created. 99 A focus on structure,
however, may create more opportunities for political judgment than
it denies.
Reference to structure has contributed to the Court's development
of a fundamental right to travel.' ° State regulations, conditioning the
95. See id. at 493 (equal protection demands undifferentiated racial neutrality).
96. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) ("Prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
97. R. BORK, supra note 15, at 165.
98. R. BORtK, supra note 15, at 165.
99. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 417-18 (1819).
100. E.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by
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enjoyment of certain benefits on duration of residency, thus have been
invalidated as breaching a basic, albeit unenumerated, guarantee.' °'
The etching of constitutional lines between allowable and impermis-
sible residency periods, however, has less linkage to what is struc-
turally implicit than to disputable perceptions of what constitutes a
reasonable waiting period and how significant a service or benefit is.102
The notion that the first amendment occupies a preferred position
in the constitutional order'0 3 aso is the result of a structural inference.
Freedom of expression may be critical to effectuating other funda-
mental liberties. 104 It is at least as debatable as it is unprovable, how-
ever, that the first amendment's prominent placement has special
significance. Insofar as some amendment had to be first it is unsafe
to draw inferences merely from the fact of being at the front of the
line. General context and circumstance are at least as significant and
more discernible for purposes of acquiring understanding. The Bill of
Rights, for instance, was a supplement tacked on to the original doc-
ument to facilitate ratification. 0 5 Because economic disarray was the
primary motivation for convening a constitutional convention, it is
arguable that structure implies priority for economic rather than ex-
pressive concerns and for commercial rather than political speech. 10 6
As a principle for depoliticizing the judiciary, structuralism sug-
gests that detailed documental attention to Congress implies the leg-
islative branch's primacy.' ° Extensive accounting for legislative powers,
however, conversely may be attributed to a dominant concern that
congressional authority should be limited. Thus, a contrary message
arguably would radiate from the less detailed charting of the judicial
Marshall, Blackmun & Powell, JJ.) (state scheme for distributing income from natural resources
to citizens according to length of residence considered at odds with the right to travel found
in "the federal structure" of "that document that transformed a loose confederation of States
into one Nation").
101. For instance, the Court upheld a one year residency requirement for purposes of
commencing a divorce action but invalidated such a condition for receiving nonemergency
medical care. Compare Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406 (1975) (divorce) with Memorial
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974) (medical care).
102. See Sosna; 419 U.S. at 404-06; Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. at 259-61.
103. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) ("[f]reedom of press land]
freedom of speech ... are in a preferred position").
104. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (first amendment is "the matrix,
the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom").
105. Incorporation of the Bill of Rights.- reflected a Federalist concession to the states'
demands for enumerated rights and liberties as a condition for ratification. See I L. POLLACK,
Tim CoNSTTUoN AND Tm SUREME COURT 119-30 (1968).
106. The economic disarray under the Articles of Confederation, and its influence upon
the Constitution's framing, are depicted in H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S.
525, 533-34 (1949).
107. See R. BoRKc, supra note 15, at 165.
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function. A fundamental deficiency of structuralism is an assumption
akin to the premise that the Constitution speaks for itself. If structure
conveys any information, the message is mixed, debatable, and sus-
ceptible to, rather than immune from, ideological filtration. Principles
attributed to structural implication, in reality, may be the result of
subjective inference.
E. Noninterpretivism
The counterpoint to literalism, originalism, neutrality, and struc-
turalism is noninterpretivism. The basic premise of the concept is that
constitutional meaning may be glossed by reference to extra-docu-
mental values. 0 Insofar as noninterpretivism concedes the validity of
constitutional decisions as political choices, it probably reflects a log-
ical implication of constitutional litigation. Constitutional advocacy
often is an extension of competing political agendas and at least im-
plicitly acknowledges the Court as a political institution. Arguments
that segregation diminished the nation's global image and efficacy, 1°9
for instance, had no more relationship to constitutional interpretation
than the competing sentiment that racial separation was dictated by
tradition and custom and facilitated public peace and order. 10
Modern jurisprudence, to the extent it fashions fundamental rights
not documentally explicated, engages in noninterpretivist work. Al-
though not confined by the four corners of the Constitution, the Court,
responding to concern with an impartial function, has developed prin-
ciples that ostensibly limit its political potential. It thus has tied rec-
ognition of fundamental rights to their being implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty or embedded in the nation's traditions and con-
science."' Fathoming what liberty implies or what is rooted in the na-
tion's ideals, however, invites rather than preempts subjectivism. How
an issue is perceived may be especially determinative of its resolution.
In Bowers v. Hardwick,"2 for instance, the Court considered whether
a state antisodomy law was at odds with the fourteenth amendment."'
108. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 24 (discussing the role of the judiciary in enforcing
principles of liberty and justice not found within the four comers of the Constitution).
109. See, e.g., Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, at 28-31, Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brief of American Federation of Teachers at 25-26, Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896) (supporting segregation as reasonable
because it reflected "established usages, customs and traditions of the people," and fostered
"the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order.").
111. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
112. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
113. Id. at 190.
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The majority characterized the issue as whether a right to engage in
homosexual sodomy was grounded in the nation's ideals."f4 Dissenting
justices depicted the question in terms of whether the right of personal
autonomy comprehended such activity."15 The rival denominations of
the issue, reflecting extensions of moral perceptions, preordained the
disparate conclusions that followed.
Discernment of the values and priorities reposed in society's con-
science, although a process abhorrent to exponents of restraint, ac-
tually may translate effectively into the respect for popular will that
apoliticists demand. Linkage of legal principle to dominant cultural
ideals would support liberty to elect an abortion only insofar as that
result were consistent with a pervasive popular preference for personal
choice."16 Honest advertence to societal traditions and moral devel-
opment also would have required endorsement of segregation, which
was deeply embedded in the North as well as the South, 17 and slavery,
which was constitutionally accommodated from the republic's incep-
tion. " 8
Noninterpretivism that merely rubber-stamps dominant impulses
may be problematic insofar as doctrinal results are considered morally
unacceptable. The problem for noninterpretivists, in establishing cred-
ibility and securing popular consent, is demonstrating that their meth-
odology is not exotic or elitist. Diverse theories have suggested that
value-inspired jurisprudence is legitimate to the extent it: is referenced
to an unwritten higher law embracing deeply held ideals;" 9 "enforces
the requirement of a greatest equal liberty" rather than majoritari-
anism as the paramount moral imperative; 20 reflects "evolving stan-
dards of decency"; 2' or factors in aspirational as well as original
meanings.'2 No matter how elegantly framed, the analytical options
are reducible to moral relativity. The resultant doctrine becomes the
extension of competing values and thus an exercise in natural justice.
114. Id. at 190-92.
115. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
116. Surveys indicate widespread support for a right to choose an abortion during the first
trimester of pregnancy when a woman's health is endangered or in the event of rape. See
Salholz, Pro-Choice: A Sleeping Giant Awakes, Nawsw=, Apr. 24, 1989, at 39.
117. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld school segregation a decade
before the Civil War on the ground that the separate education was equal, despite transportation
burdens on black students. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 209 (1849).
118. See supra note 13.
119. Grey, supra note 24, at 706.
120. D. RIcH DS, THE MoRAL CRmcism OF LAW 51 (1977).
121. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 620 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 83, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
122. M. PmuY, MoRrrY, Poixrcs, AND LAW 133 (1988).
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Noninterpretivism often reflects impatience with the output of dem-
ocratic institutions in accounting for imperatives of autonomy, di-
versity, and equality. By refusing to be bound by apolitical constraints,
noninterpretivists assume the essentially political risk of constitutional
results inspired by competing moralities or ideologies.
F. Voidism
Textual or historical uncertainty, for noninterpretivists, invites
reference to extra-documental principle. To voidists, it mandates ju-
dicial retreat. If the meaning of the Constitution cannot be deciphered
pursuant to approved interpretive principles of apoliticism, voidism
requires that "judges ... stand aside and let current democratic ma-
jorities rule, because there is no law superior to theirs."' 3 The essence
of voidism is that if the Constitution does not speak clearly, it does
not speak at all.
The privileges and immunities clause has been offered as an ex-
ample of a constitutional mystery' 24 that, according to voidist imper-
atives, merits jurisprudential disregard. The problem with the premise
is discerning when evidence of meaning or significance is nonexistent
as opposed to denied. For instance, a historically supportable argu-
ment exists that the privileges and immunities clause, although ju-
dicially eviscerated in its infancy,2 5 incorporated substantive liberties
into the fourteenth amendment. 2 6 Devitalization of the provision re-
sulted not from incomprehensibility but from judicial resolution of
disagreement over its significance, aptness, and desirability.
Voidism has the potential of minimizing the judiciary's function
to the point that constitutional guarantees themselves become only
marginally relevant. Traditionally, the establishment clause has been
construed as creating a "wall of separation between church and
state."' 2 7 Such understanding has been challenged on grounds that the
first amendment proscribes only a national religion and, possibly, sec-
tarian discrimination. 28 Because both sides cite James Madison as sup-
123. R. BoRK, supra note 15, at 167.
124. Id. at 166.
125. The Court effectively negated the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment by narrowly defining the incidents of federal citizenship and refusing to acknowl-
edge that the provision established a federal interest in civil rights and protections traditionally
affored by the states. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77-78 (1873).
126. See R. BERGER, supra note 82, at 20-36.
127. E.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1946) (quoting Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
128. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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port for their respective positions,129 a logical conclusion is that actual
meaning is indeterminate. Voidism would solve the problem by ne-
gating the establishment clause altogether. Such a possibility discloses
the potential for review which operates in the guise of restraint while
actually functioning in a profoundly activist fashion that may realign,
redistribute, redefine, or replace transcendent rights or duties. Like
all other theories of judicial review, voidism immunizes against po-
litical or ideological inspiration more as a matter of imagery than re-
ality.
H. The Failings of Formalism
The quest for a comprehensive theory of review that precludes
politicism is as futile as its ultimate aim is elusive. Consensuality is
impossible so long as diverse expectations exist for the judiciary. Even
were apoliticism universally endorsed as a general ideal, some con-
stitutional questions still would be irresoluble without subjective con-
siderations.
Typifying the problem is state action analysis, which necessarily
compromises apolitical purity. Discernment of state action is the
threshold requirement for a constitutional claim, 30 but its meaning is
not disclosed by constitutional text, framers' revelation, or docu-
mental structure. Neutral derivation of principle is confounded by the
absence of permissible reference points. The voidist solution, given
circumstances affording no apt analytical guidance, would be to ter-
minate the inquiry and thereby avoid any development of standard
or principle.
Except to the extent that state action is manifest and unadulter-
ated, such analytical pretermission would negate the significance of
the Constitution altogether. In many circumstances, state action is not
exclusively governmental, but mixed with private conduct, and thus
must be evaluated as a matter of degree. The concept of a public func-
tion, which has been used to reach private entities engaged in a gov-
129. Rehnquist, in seeking to raze the wall between church and state, alludes to Madison's
composition and revisions of the first amendment and his service in the House of Represen-
tatives during 1789. Id. at 113. Madison, however, also co-authored the Virginia Statute of
Religious Liberty of 1786, which was a forceful separatist work precluding, among other
things, public funding of religious activity. See 2 THE Wmanrros oF THomAs JE FERsoN 300-03
(1905). Madison's intentions, even if significant and debated, are not the sole determinant of
the establishment clause's meaning. Like other constitutional provisions and the document
generally, the establishment clause is the result of the competing aims and priorities that shaped
the framing and ratifying processes.
130. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
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ernmental role,' may be the most settled aspect of state action doctrine.
From the standpoint of principle and sense, however, it may be the
least convincing and most fictional, insofar as it transforms manifestly
private conduct into state action for constitutional purposes.
13 2
The case for state action might seem more persuasive when action
is taken by a person or entity licensed by the government, but the
Court has rejected such a proposition. 3 3 Unlike the public function
scenario-in which action is genuinely private but regarded as the
functional equivalent of state action and thus transformed for con-
stitutional purposes into something it is not-acts by licensed or reg-
ulated individuals or entities may be endorsed and required by law.
34
The result is a merger of private and state action. Broadcasters, for
instance, have been required to satisfy certain content requirements
as a condition to receiving and retaining a license.' 3 The Court has
avoided depicting broadcasting as state action in part because of con-
cern for first amendment implications. 36 Such analysis does not hide
the fact that state action with respect to licensing is detectable but
nonetheless ignored.
Modern state action analysis effectively reveals the pertinence of
and need for principles that invariably defeat apolitical expectations.
State action was an expansive concept during the 1950s and 1960s,
when the fourteenth amendment was actuated in terms that confronted
and defeated formal segregation. 37 Since then, its perimeter has nar-
131. E.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946) (corporate governance of company
town subject to constitutional structures).
132. Id. at 506-07.
133. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972).
134. See, e.g., infra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
135. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-80 (1969) (rejecting first
amendment challenge to fairness regulation). The fairness doctrine obligated a broadcaster to
provide programming on controversial issues of public importance and to ensure that coverage
of those issues was balanced. The FCC, in 1987, abandoned the fairness doctrine on the
ground that it retarded, rather than advanced, first amendment interests. In re Syracuse Peace
Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, 5055-57 (1987), aff'd, Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d
654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
136. If journalistic decisions of broadcasters were regarded as state actions, their editorial
autonomy would be vitiated to the extent they were precluded from exercising content
discrimination and were obligated to provide public access. No majority has coalesced in
support of or in opposition to the notion that broadcasting constitutes state action. Three
justices characterized the electronic media as "a vital part of our system of communication"
and expressed disinclination to undermine its first amendment liberty, given a regulatory scheme
reflecting an intent to "maintain for licensees ... a traditional journalistic role." Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 116 (1973) (opinion of Burger,
C.J., Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.). Two justices asserted that a licensee's refusal to sell air
time amounts to state action. Id. at 172-81 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
137. E.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724-25 (1961) (state action
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rowed consistent with the Court's inclination to animate equal pro-
tection less aggressively. 38 The narrowing of doctrinal purview and the
consequences of restraint, however, cannot be explained as a result
of apolitical standards. The inaptness of literalism, originalism, neu-
trality, and structuralism suggest instead that external reference points
at critical constitutional junctures are essential and unavoidable. In-
sistence on monasticism actually may translate into a methodology of
constitutional obstructionism and disrespect for both paramount law
and the transcendent expectations of the people.
State action jurisprudence has been criticized both for overreach-
ing and for not reaching far enough. The Court's decision in Shelley
v. Kraemer, 139 finding state action in the judicial enforcement of ra-
cially restrictive. covenants, 14° has been adverted to as a notable ex-
ample of political decision-making.' 4' If fully subscribed to as precedent,
the argument goes, private action might be converted into public ac-
tion whenever a court enforced a litigant's rights. The Shelley ruling
is reviled as an essentially moral judgment in which state action was
identified as a matter of convenience to promote judicially, rather than
democratically, ordered priorities. 4 2 It accordingly is grouped with a
long line of decisions criticized on grounds that the Court embroidered
constitutional fabric from its own stitching rather than documental
thread. 4 3
Concern that the judiciary has exceeded its role and usurped leg-
islative power is as enduring as the Constitution. Chief Justice Mar-
shall's seminal delineation of judicial authority was, for practical
purposes, a seizure of power.'" The Constitution and available records
premised upon symbiotic relationship of municipally owned garage and private restaurant
housed therein).
138. E.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972) (discrimination by
private club did not constitute state action despite award of liquor license by state).
139. 334 U.S. 1 (1947).
140. Id. at 18-19.
141. R. BoRK, supra note 15, at 151-53.
142. Id. at 153.
143. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 407 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 543 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 507-08 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). The right of privacy, especially insofar as it embraces
freedom to choose an abortion, has been criticized for being drawn from thin air. See
Brownstein, supra note 60, at 2341.
144. Marshall concluded that the Court had the power to declare a congressional enactment
invalid because it was at odds with the Constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803). That determination has been described as "an indispensable, implied char-
acteristic of a written constitution." Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69
HAnv. L. R-v. 217, 219 (1955). Such authority, however, was not ordained by the Constitution
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do not manifest clearly, comprehensively, or indisputably the extent
of the judiciary's role. 45 The first decade of Supreme Court juris-
prudence reflects an internal debate regarding appropriate jurispru-
dential reference points, including natural law.' 4 Concepts of natural
justice have inspired constitutional law throughout the nation's his-
tory. Examples range from early and mid-nineteenth century decisions
referencing the "general principles . . . which are common to our free
institutions' '147 and constitutionally secured property rights 48 to ec-
onomic and other liberties emphasized early this century149 and the
contemporary invocation of rights of privacy and personal auton-
omy. 150 Although the results and processes for fashioning such con-
cepts have elicited much criticism, popular expectations, even if
grounded in convenience, would be severely crossed if the Court was
entirely unwilling to factor in perceptions of normative ideals. The
durability of such analysis suggests that a neat delineation of gov-
ernmental powers in which the judiciary has no political function
or even an inevitable consequence of logic. See Cappelletti, Judicial Review in Comparative
Perspective, 58 CAIF. L. REv. 1017, 1024-26 (1970) (noting that judiciaries in other countries
with written constitutions do not assert interpretive supremacy.
145. Given the absence of any clear evidence, it has been observed that "[tjhe people who
say the framers intended [judicial supremacy] are talking nonsense, and the people who say
they did not intend it are talking nonsense." L. LEVY, JuDicIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME
COURT 4 (1967).
146. The debate sharpened in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). Justice Iredell
maintained that reference to natural law was unconstitutional and at odds with the democratic
process. Id. at 398-400 (Iredell, J., concurring). Justice Chase argued that government power
was curbed by constitutional and natural law, and judicial invocation of extra-constitutional
principles advanced rather than impaired popular will. Id. at 387-89.
147. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810) (invalidating state's revocation
of land grant); see also Bradshaw v. Rogers, 20 Johns. 103 (N.Y. 1822), reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION 329 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987) (court ordered state to pay
just compensation for taking of private property for public use, despite absence of constitutional
provision comparable to fifth amendment, because it was "against natural right and justice").
148. The Court interpreted the fifth amendment to mean that slaves were among consti-
tutionally protected property interests. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 46 U.S. (19 How.) 393,
450-51 (1856).
149. Rights and liberties which the Court considered to -be protected by the fourteenth
amendment included
freedom from bodily restraint ... the right of the individual to contract, to engage
in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
150. The concept of a fundamental right of privacy, although not documentally explicated,
emerged in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1965) and ultimately was anchored
in the fourteenth amendment by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
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whatsoever is at odds with historical reality, inapt as a universal prem-
ise, and incongruent with societal expectations.
The sense that courts should avoid political judgments has an
especially profound implication for minority interests. Minorities would
not win or prevail every time even in a perfect political system and,
absent overt evidence of constitutional wrongdoing such as officially
directed discrimination, it is difficult to gauge when the judiciary should
vitiate representative policy. The constitutionally ordained tripartite
system of governmental powers traditionally is referred to as a system
of checks and balances. The resultant image emphasizes a division of
responsibility calculcated to prevent a lopsided agglomeration of au-
thority and diminish the capacity of one branch to neutralize or eclipse
another branch. The premise of separate and coequal power is not
demeaned and actually may be enhanced when one governmental
branch functions, not as a check upon, but as a prod to another. What
often is criticized as a departure from apolitical standards actually may
be a fitting and respectable exercise of authority pursuant to a dynamic
rather than static separation of powers model.
The aptness of jurisprudential participation and competition in
the political marketplace is best illustrated by the need for and nature
of Brown v. Board of Education.'-" Since the tine it was rendered,
the Brown decision has been criticized for its predication upon social
science data and failure to enunciate a neutral principle. 52 A partic-
ularly notable reservation was expressed by Professor Wechsler, who
suggested that freedom of association might provide a more legally
satisfying premise. 53 Wechsler himself acknowledged uncertainty over
how associational rights, which cut both for and against desegregation,
could be developed in a principled fashion. 54 Some modern theorists
suggest that the desegregation principle can be justified on grounds
that the fourteenth amendment's architects did not understand seg-
151. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Brown Court declared segregation in public schools uncon-
stitutional. Id. at 493-95. Officially prescribed racial separation in other venues was constitu-
tionally invalidated in the years immediately following the Brown decision. See, e.g., Bynum
v. Schiro, 219 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. La. 1963) (public auditoriums), aff'd, 375 U.S. 395 (1964);
Gayle v. Browder, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.) (public buses), aff'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956);
Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.) (public beaches), aff'd, 350 U.S. 877
(1955).
152. See Wechsler, supra note 15, at 32-33.
153. Id. In considering whether there is "a basis in neutral principles for holding that the
Constitution demands that the claims for association should prevail," Wechsler asserted, "I
have not yet written the opinion. To write it, is for me the challenge of the school-segregation
cases." Id. at 34.
154. Id. at 34.
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regation to be inconsonant with equality. 155 They would square Brown
with apolitical interpretivism by incorporating lessons of segregation
into contemporary jurisprudence and thereby declaring official racial
separation constitutionally unacceptable. 5 6
The interest in such analysis nearly half a century after Brown
was decided, and long after society as a whole legally and morally
disavowed official segregation, discloses the poverty of apolitical the-
ory and operation of its principles as a formalistic impediment to so-
ciety's moral development. Implicit in the apoliticist search for a
satisfactory decisional predicate is the notion that the desegregation
order should have been put on hold until the imperatives of legalism,
requiring accommodation of favored but disputable theory, could be
satisfied. If acceptable principle is derivable only from apolitically
compatible sources, so that the democratic process is not compro-
mised, the theory of review assumes too much about the framers' alms
and too little about methodologies of accounting for popular will. The
architects of the fourteenth amendment and its early interpreters did
not comprehend that segregation was at odds with equality. 57 Com-
mon ground for the amendment's supporters and detractors were pre-
vailing cultural norms that regarded racial inequality as a fundamental
truth. 58 Even in dissenting from the Court's constitutionalization of
official segregation later in the nineteenth century, Justice Harlan dis-
closed investment in the tenets of racial superiority. 5 9 Given the per-
vasiveness of such sentiment, it is difficult in retrospect to regard
fourteenth amendment choices as a now soluble conflict between
equality and separation. Such an accommodation suggests a stronger
interest in preserving a theory than expounding a constitution. A more
accurate view is that the framers simply intended to set aside con-
stitutionally a discrete preserve of equality defined in limited terms of
economic opportunity and standing before the law.lw
155. R. BoRic, supra note 15, at 82.
156. Id. ("Since equality and segregation were mutually inconsistent, though the ratifiers
did not understand that, both could not be honored .... [I]t is obvious the Court must choose
equality and prohibit state-imposed segregation").
157. E.g., CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Wilson).
158. The debates of the fourteenth amendment are saturated with references, by supporters
and opponents, to what they perceived as the undesirability and inferiority of African-
Americans. See, e.g., id. at 252 (Sen. Julian) (referring to "proverbial hatred of blacks"); id.
at 935 (Sen. Davis) ("It]he white race . . . will be the proprietors of the land, and the blacks
its cultivators").
159. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (expressing sense
that the white race was and would remain dominant so long as it adhered to its principles).
160. See R. BERGER, supra note 82, at 22.
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The fourteenth amendment, given its originating circumstances,
was not a mandate for comprehensive equality. If jurisprudence is to
be faithful to principles of apolitical review, it should not amount now
to more than the limited grant of equality initially contemplated. No
theory is likely to attain normative credibility, however, without at
least accommodating the Brown result. Unvarying apoliticism thus is
futile because the desegregation principle ineluctably was a product
of political inspiration and necessity. Though indefensible pursuant
to principles of apolitical review, the Brown decision is justifiable as
a decision that is both political and imperative to a system of gov-
ernmental checks and balances. In 1954, segregation was a moral as
well as legal issue. The representative process may have been the nor-
mal forum for debating and resolving such a question, but the leg-
islative and executive branches at the time were unreceptive and even
hostile to a civil rights agenda.161 Even if official segregation was at
odds with evolving national sentiment, regional insistence upon it was
magnified in the representative process and effectively transformed
Congress itself into an institution that was at least dysfunctional if not
entirely antidemocratic. Respect for the formalities of apoliticism would
have cast the Court into a role in which, to avoid political judgment,
it would have had to cramp dogmatically its checking function in the
balance of powers. However the Court decided the case, its decision
would have left a political imprint for which it either would have been
applauded or cursed.
Post-Brown jurisprudence further suggests that the antidemo-
cratic concerns prompting apolitical theory are inflated. Society largely
has responded to the antidiscrimination principle by resegregating it-
self pursuant to private rather than official action. Responding to the
reality of white flight and resegregation, in the aftermath of a school
desegregation order, the Court adverted to the consequence as a "nor-
mal pattern of human migration.' ' 2 Such rhetoric, although akin to
an earlier observation that segregation accounted for distinctions "in
the nature of things,"' 63 represents part of a general jurisprudential
pattern largely accommodating to popular inclination. 164
Criticism of politically influenced jurisprudence as anti-demo-
cratic is especially inapt when results are tested by the representative
process itself. Within a few years of the desegregation mandate, the
161. White, Warren Court, in AmERncAN CONsnTI=oNAL HISTORY 280 (L. Levy ed. 1989).
162. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436 (1976).
163. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
164. See Lively & Plass, Equal Protection: The Jurisprudence of Denial and Evasion, 40
AM. U.L. Rnv. 1307, 1324-26 (1991).
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executive branch had dispatched federal troops to enforce it.165 Con-
gress later enacted comprehensive civil rights legislation, including pro-
visions to enforce the Brown principle.'6 Eventually, the reach of
desegregation and antidiscrimination doctrine was curtailed by limiting
principles attuned to a dominant sense that the process had "gone far
enough."' 167 A like denouement of the Lochner era, in the late 1930s,1
68
further illustrates the exaggerated nature of concerns with judicial im-
perialism.
The devolution of both Brown and Lochner demonstrate the basic
truth that the Court can prod the representative process and overcome
dysfunction, but only to the point that popular sentiment allows. To
suggest that the Court must exercise restraint and avoid political judg-
ment because it has the final word in declaring what the law is, and
thus is beyond any curbing influence or accounting, distorts reality.
As resistance to busing in the late 1960s and 1970s demonstrated,
6 9
the Court has limited amplitude for political decisionmaking beyond
which it risks becoming an irrelevant and unrespected force. Reali-
zation that its political capital is limited, and its moralistic role is re-
stricted to an essentially catalytic function, is a more realistic check
on the judiciary than abstract, sometimes incomprehensible, and too
often unrealistic principles of apoliticism.
Rather than being apart from society's moral development, the
judiciary has a critical role to play in its progress. The notion that
165. Federal troops were sent into Little Rock, Arkansas to enforce the Court's desegre-
gation order in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), which the state legislature had declared
null and void.
166. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000e (1988), prohibits discrimination
in education, employment, and public facilities and accommodations. It also enables the Justice
Department to file suit for desegregation orders. Additionally, the Act authorizes the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services to condition aid to public schools on compliance with
desegregation regulations.
167. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 814 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
168. Repudiation of Lochnerism was particularly well-exemplified by Justice Black's ret-
rospective observation that "[w]hether the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith,
Herbert Spencer, Lord Keynes, or some other is no concern of ours." Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963). In other words, the Court had "gone far enough" in developing
principles in the nature of economic regulation.
169. Richard Nixon's campaign promise in 1968 to appoint strict constructionists as Supreme
Court justices responded to mounting public anxiety over and opposition to court-ordered
busing. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 59, at 186-89. The distinction between de jure and de
facto segregation was introduced and subscribed to as public antagonism in the North and
West had swollen. The point of differentiation, as Justice Powell observed, was politically
expedient. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 218-19 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring
and dissenting) ("[n]o comparable progress ... in many non-southern cities, . . . primarily
because of the de facto/de jure distinction nurtured by the courts and accepted complacently
by many of the same voices which denounced the evils of segregated schools in the South."
(footnote omitted)).
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democratic imperatives require the judiciary to control itself exists as
an axiom, even if it tends to be honored in the breach rather than in
the observance. 170 Reverence for the democratic process, when the role
of the judiciary is at issue, generally operates beyond the pale of crit-
ical appraisal. Largely uncontested perceptions that the judiciary is
inimical to popular will are the consequence of a sense that the consent
of the governed and the representative process are perfectly and ex-
clusively linked. Even theories for judicial intervention are couched
in terms of exigent circumstances which pay tribute to the imagery.
Modern accounting for minority interests pursuant to the equal pro-
tection guarantee, for instance, radiates from the premise of process
dysfunction. Judicial intercession thus has been excused in the event
of claims by an historically disadvantaged minority excluded from or
underrepresented by a consequently distorted legislative process.' 71
Such theory is as legalistic as the philosophy of restraint it to
which it responds, and is unnecessarily apologetic for and circum-
scriptive of the exercise of power. Accepting the judiciary's catalytic
function as a sometimes necessary aspect of the balancing of power,
and part of a proper role in competing for the consent of the governed,
affords premises that are more convincing and consonant with dem-
ocratic ideals.
Forthright acknowledgment and justification of a proactive but
apt function would help dispel the myth that the legislature has a mo-
nopoly on accounting for popular sentiment. The reality is that the
legislative process traditionally has been captive to special interest
groups.' 72 For most of the nation's history elected federal agents have
been chosen by white males, 73 and even now electoral participation
includes half or less of those actually qualified to vote. 74
To limit the judicial function, because the legislature is the re-
pository of popular will, is an essentially procrustean exercise that
places theorists in the awkward position of predicating principles on
the basis of what should be rather than what is. In a representative
system that is perfectly reflective of popular will, the legislative process
170. T. PowELL, VAGARIES AND VARITIES IN CotsrTuoNAi INTERPREATION 42-43 (1956).
171. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
172. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 565 n.9 (1985) (Powell,
J., dissenting); id. at 584 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 1
173. The Constitution was amended in 1870 and 1920 to provide that voting rights could
not be abridged or denied on the basis of race or sex, respectively. U.S. CONST. amends. XV
and XIX.
174. 1989 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED STATES, No. 433, at 258 (50.2% of
qualified voters participated in 1988 presidential election; 33.4% participated in 1986 congres-
sional election).
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may yield an accurate measure of dominant preference and inclina-
tions. Even without such consonance, representative output may help
inform understanding of popular sentiment. Absent absolute congruity
between process and will, however, political jurisprudence may be apt
for purposes of improving what otherwise is imperfect. Preclusion of
that possibility, on the ground that the judiciary is unfit for political
activity, not only disregards history but may disrespect the people
themselves.
If judicial review is to be linked with popular consent, theory
should maximize rather than minimize possible contact points. The
representative process is but one possible avenue for discerning the
citizenry's countenance. If respect for and deference to the people are
to be taken seriously, an equally significant point of inspiration is the
public's perception of the Constitution. It is not uncommon for pop-
ular thinking to associate the principles that "all men are created equal"
and that they have "inalienable rights" of "life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness' '1 75 with the Constitution. The merger of constitutional
and natural law principles in the minds of many, if not most, citizens
may reflect an educational failure. For purposes of expounding con-
stitutional law that is consistent rather than at odds with popular un-
derstanding and expectation, however, this reality reinforces the case
for a politically sensitive judiciary.
Upsetting as it may be to apostles of apoliticism, an enduring
popular sense of transcendent rights remains an apt reference point
for the development of fundamental law. Disregarding it, and making
the legislature the exclusive and penultimate point of consideration
absent documental direction to the contrary, advances a monastic ver-
sion of legalism and formalism that is unable to account for societal
and institutional imperfections and needs. Gleaning popular attitude
may be an uncertain rather than precise science. It is no answer, how-
ever, to maintain that the judiciary should restrain itself when con-
stitutional text, history or structure is indeterminate. Reality is that
the Court, for better or worse, historically has been looked to as a
contributor to society's moral development. To revoke that function
would revise the sources of input for moral development and, in the
process, derogate established public expectations that the judiciary will
have such a participatory role.
Prominently exemplifying why the Court cannot bypass a political
function is the Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford. 176 A hold-
ing either for or against slavery was destined to exacerbate sectional
175. These passages are contained in the Declaration of Independence, perhaps the most
prominent exposition of natural law.
176. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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tension and friction. The failure of the Court to exercise moral leader-
ship, as it would a century later in declaring segregation unconsti-
tutional, is instructive for purposes of understanding what enhances
and detracts from its prestige and defines its proper role. The vali-
dation of slavery, insofar as it was referenced to dominant racial at-
titudes contemporaneous with the constitution's framing, 177 was a fair
tribute to imperatives of originalism. The Court's judgment fairly re-
flected the state of moral development that inspired the Constitution
in terms which accommodated slavery and racial inequality. 178 Meas-
ured against prevailing cultural norms, the Dred Scott decision also
reflected a reasonably accurate reading of mid-nineteenth century moral
temper, North and South. 179 Although slavery evolved into an exclu-
sively southern institution, official segregation emerged in the North 80
where racial phobia and animus were deep-seated. 8' Despite dominant
racist sentiment and anxiety that emancipated slaves might compete
in an employment marketplace traditionally reserved for whites,8 2 the
Dred Scott decision evoked unprecedented reproval and ultimately re-
pudiation. 83 The profoundly negative reaction to the Court's judg-
ment and consequent loss of institutional prestige suggest that a
narrowly conceived and apolitical judicial function neither avoids po-
litical entanglement nor responds fully to public expectations. Even
if consistent with prevailing racial attitudes, the Court failed to pro-
vide the moral leadership and guidance expected of it. A different decision
may not have resolved the slavery issue or averted secession and civil
war, but the Court would not have sacrificed its credibility and status,
and society would not have been denied a source of moral inspira-
tion. 8 4
177. Id. at 405; id. at 410 (observing that if written in the mid-nineteenth century the
Declaration of Independence would be understood to "embrace the whole human family,"
but historical facts demonstrated that when actually written it was not considered to apply to
"the enslaved African race").
178. Id. at 407-12.
179. As Susan B. Anthony observed, the Scott decision "infamous as it is, is but the
reflection of the spirit and practice of the American people, North as well as South." D.
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScoTT CASE 430 (1978) (quoting draft of speech, 1861, at 13, 16,
Susan B. Anthony Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
180. Segregation of public schools first was upheld in Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass.
(5 Cush.) 198, 209 (1849). See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
181. See R. BERGER, supra note 82, at 12; D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND Am:EpCAN LAW §
1.3 (1980).
182. R. BERGER, supra note 82, at 12.
183. As a consequence of the Dred Scott ruling, the Court became known as "the citadel
of Slaverocracy." A. MASON, THE SuPR'.E COURT FROM TAFrT TO WARREN 16 (1958) (quoting
Van Hoist).
184. Modem exponents of restraint have characterized the Dred Scott decision as an
example that proves their argument for nonpolitical jurisprudence. They allude to the Court's
August 1991] 1555
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Proponents of apolitical jurisprudence insist that the Court must
forego moral choice and accept the state of normative development
as reflected by law. This assertion, however, simplifies the decision
which courts must make. The public actually sends conflicting signals,
demanding that the Court respect its will while looking to the judiciary
for vindication of rights and interests that are not constitutionally ex-
plicated or implied. The judiciary thus is obligated to reconcile those
competing expectations, a responsibility that is not performed with
respect for democratic imperative when a common even if incongruous
perception simply is factored out.
Even so, allowance for a political function is the source of dismay
and warning that it imperils "the legitimacy of law itself."' 85 Such
distress is exaggerated since the judiciary seldom has strayed signif-
icantly beyond the ambit of dominant societal norms. It also is mis-
placed to the extent that perceptions of the Court's function are more
crucial to institutional prestige and the law's consequent legitimacy
than any academic theory of practice or review. No matter how ren-
dered, decisions concerning slavery, segregation, abortion, and other
culturally determinative controversies will be perceived by the bulk of
the citizenry as political because the consequences are political. De-
politicization of the judiciary may account for theoretical purity, but
the practical consequence is radical revision of established functional
reality.
111. The Invariably and Invaluably Political Judiciary
Debate over the role of the judiciary has raged unabated since
the republic's inception. As noted previously, 8 6 Justices Chase and
Iredell clashed over whether the Court could advert to extra-docu-
mental principle in fashioning fundamental law. The debate persisted
development of substantive due process to invalidate the Missouri Compromise. R. BoRK,
supra note 15, at 30-34. The judgment represented the first judicial vitiation of a congressional
act in half a century and the second since the republic's founding. Until the Dred Scott
decision, the only instance of judicial displacement of congressional action was the Court's
1803 determination that the Judiciary Act of 1789 in part exceeded the purview of Article III
of the Constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803). Chief Justice
Taney's advertence to the fifth amendment in the closing sections of the Dred Scott opinion,
however, was not essential to the result, which also relied upon original intent. Subtraction of
the substantive due process analysis leaves an opinion rooted in originalism and endorsing the
same outcome. Without allowing the Court the option, if not responsibility, to factor in moral
and political considerations, the argument that Dred Scott was wrongly decided is no more
persuasive now than it was in 1857.
185. R. BosuK, supra note 15, at 349.
186. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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even as, and perhaps because, the Constitution expanded and incor-
porated new and significant but imprecisely defined terms.
Introduction of the fourteenth amendment 8 7 renewed the con-
troversy over apt jurisprudential reference points. Four justices in the
Slaughter-House Cases'88 advanced a reading of the privileges and im-
munities clause as a repository of "natural and inalienable rights."' 89
The majority, however, rejected the notion of a potentially open-ended
incorporation of transcendent privileges and immunities restricting the
power of the states."''9
Notwithstanding the Slaughter-House Court's sense that the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause was concerned only with pro-
cedure,' 91 the provision soon was crafted into a source of overarching
rights and liberties against which economic and social legislation would
be measured. 92 Against such selective application, Justice Holmes ar-
gued that "a Constitution is not intended to embody a particular ec-
onomic theory .... It is made for people of fundamentally differing
views . . . ,,193 A few decades later the Court acceded to Holmes'
sense of circumscribed review, except to the extent historically dis-
advantaged minorities might be burdened by a distorted political proc-
ess or to the extent basic rights or liberties were implicated.' 94
The legacy of the Lochner era, particularly the political revolt
which its activist mode of review engendered, 95 seems indelibly etched
upon the Court's memory and has profoundly affected modern stan-
dards of review. Instead of closely scrutinizing social and economic
legislation from a policy perspective, the Court employs a deferential
187. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
188. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
189. Id. at 97 (Field, J., joined by Chase, C.J. and Swayne and Bradley, JJ., dissenting).
190. Id. at 77-78 (holding that fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause
referred only to rights already protected by the Constitution).
191. Id. at 80-81.
192. A few decades after it recognized the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
as centrally concerned with "action of a state ... by way of discrimination against ...
negroes," id. at 81, the Court relaxed scrutiny of racial classification and fortified its review
of economic regulation. Compare Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (liberty
includes right to contract for purpose of pursuing livelihood or avocation) with Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549-51 (1896) (racial classification permissible if reasonably related
to maintenance of public order and comfort).
193. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
194. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
195. After the Court invalidated several pieces of New Deal legislation, President Roosevelt
engineered a plan to expand the Court so that he could appoint justices more favorably
disposed toward his policies. Congress defeated the initiative but, after deaths and retirements
in the years immediately following, Roosevelt effectively reshaped the Court in a manner more
to his liking. See H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICE AND PRESIDENTS: A POLTCAL HISTORY OF APPOINT-
MENTS TO T SUPREE CouRT 206-247 (2d ed. 1984).
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rational basis test. 196 Mere rationality responds to perceived lessons
"that the Constitution. . . can actively intrude into.., economic and
policy matters only if [we are] prepared to bear enormous institutional
and social costs.' 1 97
Notwithstanding past experience and new political risks, the Court
from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s expounded both the due process
and the equal protection clauses in substantive and sometimes forceful
terms.19 8 Attention to racial discrimination was consistent with the res-
ervation of judicial interest when the Court abandoned its function
earlier this century as a general superlegislature. 199 The extension of
the equal protection guarantee to reach other variants of
discrimination" broke new ground which the framers and early in-
terpretations of the equal protection clause never anticipated. 20' Sim-
ilarly, the expounding of a right of privacy, and its subsequent mitosis
to account not only for conjugal intimacy2w but also for reproductive
autonomy,203 marriage, 204 and family style,2°5 has regenerated due proc-
ess as a source of substantive rights not originally contemplated by
the fourteenth amendment.
In using the fourteenth amendment as a point of importation for
principles external to the document itself, the Court anticipated crit-
icism of the grafting process as neo-Lochnerist and attempted to de-
fuse it. Initial resort to cloaking devices, such as "penumbras and
emanations,' '2 6 reflected an effort to pitch the Court's activist work
196. E.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (holding that the
"judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom of" economic policy).
197. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 62 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
198. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973) (recognizing qualified right to
elect abortion); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (demanding a deseg-
regation plan that "work[s] now"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)
(recognizing right of privacy); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (refusing delay in
desegregation despite public furor and resistance).
199. In abandoning substantive due process review, the Court left open the possibility of
elevated attention when racial classification or prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
was at issue. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
200. The equal protection guarantee has been extended to reach legislation discriminating
on the basis of gender, alienage and the unwed status of a child's parents. See, e.g., Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976) (gender); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 645-46
(1973) (alienage); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (illegitimacy).
201. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873) (doubting whether equal
protection guarantee ever would be held to apply to discrimination against groups other than
blacks).
202. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (right to marital privacy).
203. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973) (liberty to elect abortion).
204. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-85 (1978) (right to marry).
205. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion) (liberty
to choose family living arrangements).
206. Justice Douglas, writing for a four person plurality, originally asserted that the right
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in terms consonant with apoliticism. The notion that the document
or certain permutations of its provisions radiate special messages and
meaning is a structuralist premise.2° Because the Constitution implies
no more than it explicates, foundational efforts to construct a right
of privacy were misleading if not deceitful. The right of privacy even-
tually was anchored more forthrightly in the fourteenth amendment, 208
and fundamental rights analysis was transduced into an inquiry con-
cerning whether a claimed freedom was "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty"' 0 or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tra-
dition. ' 210 Such criteria, although offered as self-imposed checks on
review, lend themselves to broad operation and political use. No verbal
formula, regardless of how deferentially or apolitically cast, can guard
against policy review and displacement.2 11 Over the past decade, the
Court effectively has imposed a moratorium on substantive due proc-
ess review.212 Even if the interval of restraint reflects a philosophical
commitment, it does not resolve the ultimate issue of whether a po-
litical function is positive or negative. Debate over the aptness and
utility of extra-documental review thus remains as pertinent and prom-
inent now as it was two centuries ago.
As evolved over 200 years, the dispute has resulted in two general
schools of thought. The absolutist concept of restraint is that the Court
never should displace the work of the representative process except
when a discernible conflict exists with principle that is textually, his-
torically, or neutrally discerned.213 Competing against that premise, are
a panoply of theories reflecting the shared sense, although not nec-
essarily the precise justification, that judicially-created law is permis-
sible pursuant to special or compelling circumstances. 21 4 Regardless of
how they are specifically pitched, most relativist theories take pains
of privacy emanated from various specific constitutional guarantees including the first, third,
fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
The resultant concept of constitutional penumbras was widely criticized and eventually shelved.
See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
208. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (right of privacy housed in fourteenth
amendment).
209. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
210. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
211. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56-57 (1925) (invalidating minimum hour regulation
while professing that its role is not to second-guess legislative judgment).
212. The Court refused to invalidate an antisodomy statute, for instance, despite arguments
that it compromised the right of privacy. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
213. The methodologies of review are discussed supra notes 36-96 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
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to express their respect for the democratic process. Introduction of
reference points, such as process defect, 215 "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, ' '21 6 and "rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion, ' 21 7 are offered by proponents of qualified restraint as safeguards
against political-judgment making. Such presentments operate pri-
marily as disarming verbal imagery and thus occlude legitimate reasons
for latitude to make political decisions.
Despite their disagreements, exponents of absolute and relative
apoliticism share the sense that the judiciary's role must be fixed and
immutable. This notion, whether it leads to comprehensive or partial
political restraint, represents a common effort to square the judicial
function with democratic expectations. Such constraint, however, may
impair societal development and even the representative process. As
noted previously, inability to render an essentially political decision
would have frozen the legislative creation of official segregation and
discrimination indefinitely. 2 8 A catalytic but undeniably political func-
tion was an essential prerequisite for the legislative process' ultimate
dismantling of segregation. 21 9
Foreclosure of the Court's political role would be incongruent
with popular expectations of a moral facilitation function. Justice
Black, borrowing from Judge Hand, observed that '[flor myself it
would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians,
even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not.' 220
As offered to support an unqualifiedly apolitical judiciary, the as-
sertion is hyperbolic. Plato regarded justice as a quality comprehen-
sible only by a philosopher caste ruling without accountability in an
ideal state.22' To suggest that a politically sensitive Court would op-
erate free of significant checks and balances, and thus would be the
functional equivalent of Platonic elitism, is as misleading as it is myopic.
Reality is that the judiciary, and the Supreme Court in particular,
have been, are, and will be political because the other branches of
government and the public even while protesting expect it to be po-
litical. Over the course of the nation's history, the nomination and
215. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938).
216. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
217. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(plurality opinion)).
218. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
220. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 526-27 (1965) (Black J., dissenting) (quoting
L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTs 73 (1958)).
221. See D. LLOYD, THE IDEA OF LAW 74-75 (1976).
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appointment of judges and justices has been politically inspired. Pres-
idents Washington and Adams, for instance, filled the Supreme Court
with advocates of a strong central government. m Adams' investment
in Chief Justice Marshall paid off in long-term rewards for a Federalist
agenda concerned with a strong central government and national econ-
omy.m Presidents Harrison, Cleveland, and Taft screened nominees
to ensure they subscribed to laissez-faire economics and were sym-
pathetic to private enterprisen Extraction of commitments to shelter
those ideals and concerns, as a condition of appointment, helped pro-
gram the Court's political function as champion of economic and other
liberties. 5
President Roosevelt ushered out the Lochner era by appointing
justices sympathetic to the New Deal.226 President Nixon sought "law
and order" justices who also would circumscribe the equal protection
guarantee's operation.2 7 President Reagan employed a litmus test to
insure "respect for traditional family values and the sanctity of human
life."' m The use of computer technology to investigate fully a can-
didate's background, combined with two presidential terms of op-
portunity to nominate judges and justices, enabled the Reagan
Administration to effect perhaps the most comprehensive political re-
casting of the federal judiciary in the Court's history.? 9
Given the political inspiration that frequently motivates the ju-
dicial appointment process, it is unreasonable and incongruous to ex-
pect jurisprudence to rise above ideological consideration. Chief Justice
Rehnquist has endorsed the notion that justices, once appointed, are
subject to centrifugal forces and new variables that lead to unpre-
dictable results.330 Chief Justice Warren routinely is identified as an
222. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 195, at 71-84.
223. E.g. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 17-18 (1824) (Congress's commerce
power is plenary); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324-26 (1819) (broadly
interpreting necessary and proper clause); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518, 627-50 (1819) (contracts clause prohibits state legislatures from converting a private school
into a public institution).
224. See H. ABMwm, supra note 195, at 138-51, 163-73; A. MASON, WLIAM HowARD
TAFT - CmiEF JusTIcE 157-58 (1983).
225. See H. ABRAHM, supra note 195, at 135-50. At the height of the Lochner era, the
Court identified a panoply of fundamental, albeit documentally unenumerated, liberties itemized
in note 149 supra.
226. See D. LIVELY, supra note 11, at 111-13.
227. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 195, at 14.
228. Brownstein, supra note 60, at 2340.
229. See D. LrvELY, supra note 11, at 68-69.
230. Rehnquist, Presidential Appointments to the Supreme Court, 2 CoNsT. COMMENTARY
319, 328-29 (1985).
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example of such surprise. The reality is that Warren was chosen for
reasons that were political but unrelated to ideology."' Rehnquist him-
self appears to be the model of an appointee who, like Chief Justice
Marshall, 232 has performed consistent with the political expectations
that prompted his nomination.
More damaging to the judiciary's integrity and credibility than
political decisionmaking is the pretense of an apolitical or nonideo-
logical exercise of power. Cutting through the misleading imagery of
monasticism would be a forthright acknowledgment that the judiciary
has a political function that may be exercised intuitively. Exponents
of documental fidelity and subscribers to qualified activism may unite
in regarding the proposition as unsettling and overtly anti-democratic.
It is a jurisprudential reality, however, long countenanced by coor-
dinate branches of government and the citizenry and fundamentally
pro-democratic.
An identified risk of political activism is that the Court may de-
cide rightly in some instances but wrongly in others.2 3 The point ar-
gued is that for each Brown there is a Plessy or Dred Scott, and for
each Roe there is a Lochner. What is put forward as a negative, how-
ever, actually is a positive insofar as it reflects competition of ideas
within and between branches of government. To the extent the Court
permanently might enforce principles at variance with popular ex-
pectations, judicial imperialism may be a fair charge. In truth, how-
ever, the Court cannot have its way when other branches of government
and the public align themselves against it. Slavery was destroyed pur-
suant to the Civil War and the thirteenth amendment. 234 Official seg-
regation endured and functioned in synchronization with society's moral
development. The determination that separate inherently is unequal
would have been meaningless unless the executive and legislative
branches joined with the judiciary in support of desegregation. 23 Sim-
ilarly, the Court's contemporary resistance to race-conscious reme-
diation, although reflecting a reading of the fourteenth amendment
231. President Eisenhower's political motivation in nominating Warren was less ideological
than pragmatic. Warren was rewarded for his help in securing the 1952 presidential nomination
for Eisenhower. The choice also defused factionalism in the California Republican Party. See
B. ScHwARTz, SUPER CHIEF 20-22 (1983); G. W=rT, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIc LIFE 139-44
(1982).
232. President Adams' motivation in nominating Marshall was to secure the Federalist
agenda from the influences of competing ideology. See D. LIVELY, supra note 11, at 36-37.
Marshall's performance largely was faithful to the nationalist vision. See supra note 222 and
accompanying text.
233. See R. BORK, supra note 15, at 32.
234. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
235. See supra notes 165-166 and accompanying text.
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arguably at odds with original concern,2 6 is congruent with majori-
tarian animus toward affirmative action.
In place of reality, imperatives of apoliticism would impose upon
the judiciary theories of review that are as impracticable as they are
debatable. The danger of being "ruled by a bevy of Platonic guard-
ians" is accentuated not by a candidly political judiciary but by stan-
dards that require judges and justices to be full-time constitutional
scholars and sophisticates. In actuality, federal jurists, whether as a
function of temper, resources, interests, or training, will not confront
every constitutional issue with a comprehensive understanding of text,
history, or structure, or with neutrality. The best expectation is that
decision-makers, many if not most of whom were appointed for po-
litical reasons, will make a sincere effort to evolve principles that will
survive public scrutiny and thus neither wither nor engender revolt.
Disaffection with a political judiciary reflects a sense of the rep-
resentative process unsupported by history or the Constitution itself.
To elevate Congress to the status of exclusive reference point for pol-
icy-making would be to award it a confidence and trust that never has
been afforded to the institution. A legislative process truly compre-
hensive in its representativeness was neither originally conceived nor
eventually effected .37 Contrary to the structuralist argument that de-
tailed documental attention to the legislative system implies consti-
tutional favor for it,23s mistrust of unqualifiedly representative
governance is the norm rather than the exception. Despite changes that
have made the political process more representative, 239 democratic im-
peratives will benefit further to the extent the legislature is held ac-
countable by checks that are constitutional albeit political.
Congress on multiple occasions has threatened to trim the Court's
jurisdictional sails. Typically, such initiatives respond to a jurispru-
dentially crafted principle that is as controversial as its political im-
plications are profound. It may be debated whether Congress actually
could remove from jurisdiction issues which the Court might assert
as constitutional. The dispute would be largely academic, however,
because the institution holding the position more reflective of public
236. The fourteenth amendment's original concern, as amplified by seminal jurisprudence
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, focused upon equal economic opportunity for African-
Americans. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873); R. BERGER, supra
note 82, at 22-36.
237. See supra notes 172-174 and accompanying.text.
238. See R. BoRK, supra note 15, at 165-67.
239. In addition to amendments securing the franchise for groups previously denied the
right to vote, U.S. CONST. amends. XV and XIX, the Constitution has been modified so that
senators are elected by direct ballot, U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVII.
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priorities and aspirations will prevail-if not immediately, then over
the more important long run. Such a reality helps explain why Con-
gress penalized the Court in the 1860s by reducing its size 40 but has
retreated from other initiatives for constricting jurisdiction. 24
Respect for democratic governance should include recognition that
judicial output eliciting popular trust and subscription, regardless of
theory of review, secures the consent of the governed. A fixed delin-
eation of power that disables the judiciary as a political force risks
the loss of institutional competition which in a system of checks and
balances facilitates both legal and moral progress. The possibility ex-
ists that the Court will render politically unpopular or otherwise ob-
jectionable decisions. In doing so, however, the judiciary always
remains susceptible to the ultimate check of being ignored.
Conclusion
If the judiciary is effectively depoliticized, society may be pro-
tected from unwise jurisprudence but at the cost of principle that may
be apt. As a general rather than limited or silent partner on political
matters, the Court may function as a check and balance and will itself
be likewise limited. An institutional sense of political acuity and pos-
sibility is more effective than any precise theory of restraint calculated
to eliminate the risks of judicial review. Any peril to democratic prin-
ciples is a function not of constitutional jurisprudence but failure of
representative governance to contest perceived overreaching, as the
Lincoln Administration did in disregarding the Court's validation of
slavery and states continue to do in challenging the judicially desig-
nated liberty to elect an abortion. Default by the more obviously po-
litical branch of government presents an argument for inferring consent
rather than cramping the operation of a separate and independent
branch of government.
The legislature is susceptible to process distorting forces that un-
dermine a function as the sole vindicator of popular will.242 Aims usu-
ally associated with the case for an apolitical judiciary actually would
seem better facilitated by recognition that the will and development
of the people are optimized by institutional competition for popular
endorsement rather than by jurisprudential sterilization. Instead of
240. See L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 126 (1985).
241. Similarly, Congress has considered but defeated bills that would limit federal courts'
jurisdiction in abortion cases and curtail their power to order busing in enforcing the
desegregation of public schools. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 52 (1985).
242. See supra notes 172, 174 and accompanying text.
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undermining governance attuned to the consent of the governed, po-
litical jurisprudence effectively may account for it. Competitive pres-
sure upon the legislature and the judiciary thus advances rather than
retards democratic interests insofar as the institutions of governance
are pushed to respond to the people in the most forthright and least
paternalistic fashion.

